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Taxpayer Services and Tax 
Compliance
James Alm, Georgia State University; Michael Jones, Bridgewater State 
College; and Michael McKee, Appalachian State University
A n important trend in tax administration policies in recent years is the recognition that the traditional “enforcement” paradigm of tax administration, in which taxpayers are viewed and treated as 
potential criminals and the emphasis is exclusively on repression of illegal 
behavior through frequent audits and stiff penalties, is incomplete.  A revised 
“service” paradigm recognizes the role of enforcement, but also emphasizes 
the role of the tax administration as a facilitator and a provider of services to 
taxpayer-citizens (Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2003).  Indeed, many recent 
tax administration reforms around the world have also embraced this alterna-
tive paradigm with some success.  However, while such “kinder, friendlier” 
provisions may improve the image of the tax authority, their actual effects on 
tax compliance have not, to our knowledge, been quantified.  Our research 
utilizes laboratory experiments as a means of testing the range of possible in-
formation programs in terms of their effectiveness in enhancing tax compli-
ance, and of comparing the compliance impacts of these “service” programs 
to the impacts of increased “enforcement” efforts.
In particular, subjects in our experiments earn income, report net 
income to a tax authority, and face an audit process.  To investigate the 
existence of taxpayer services, we complicate the compliance decision of 
subjects, and then provide services that allow subjects to compute more eas-
ily their tax liabilities.  By comparing the compliance responses of subjects 
to these service programs relative to more traditional enforcement methods 
(e.g., penalties and audits), we are able to determine the relative effective-
ness of the alternative paradigms in generating greater taxpayer compliance. 
Our results are very preliminary, but they suggest that better services have 
less impact on compliance than increased enforcement.  Future work will 
explore this important issue in much more detail.
Tax Compliance as a Behavioral Phenomenon
The simplest description of the tax compliance decision derives from the 
economics of crime approach pioneered by Becker (1968).  The taxpayer is 
viewed here as facing a gamble between choosing the legal activity (e.g., full 
compliance) and the illegal activity (e.g., evasion).  This is the framework 
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explored by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and subsequently modified by 
many others.  See Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), Slemrod and Yit-
zhaki (2002), and Alm (2007) for recent surveys of the literature.
To illustrate, suppose that an individual receives a fixed amount of in-
come I and must choose how much to declare to the tax authorities.  Declared 
income D is taxed at the rate t.  Unreported income is not taxed; however, the 
individual may be audited with probability p, at which point all unreported 
income is discovered and a fine f is imposed on each dollar of unpaid taxes.  
For the interesting case where D < I, the individual’s income IC if caught un-
derreporting equals IC=I-tD-ft(I-D), while, if underreporting is not detected, 
income IN is IN=I–tD.  The individual chooses D to maximize the expected 
utility EU(I) of the evasion gamble, or EU(I) = pU(IC ) + (1-p)U(IN ), where 
utility U(I) is assumed to be a function only of income.  It is straightforward 
to show from this optimization that increases in the probability of an audit 
and/or the fine rate will increase compliance; that is, the standard model 
clearly demonstrates the role of an “enforcement” paradigm in generating 
greater tax compliance.  Indeed, in this approach, the only reason for an indi-
vidual to pay his or her taxes is the fear of detection (p) and punishment (f).
This approach has proven quite useful in the analysis of tax evasion.  
Even so, this approach is also a significant oversimplification of the broad 
activity we call “tax evasion.”  In the naturally occurring world, the setting 
and the resulting behavior are much more complex, which affects behavior 
in ways that go far beyond the scope of the basic model, and many relevant 
aspects of the compliance decision are necessarily omitted in this simple 
framework.  Also, and of particular importance, observed high compli-
ance rates in many countries are largely inconsistent with rational behavior 
assumed by the economics of crime model, given the enforcement efforts 
pursued by most governments.  This observation suggests that the implicit 
assumptions underlying the application of the economics of crime approach 
to evasion require further investigation.
For example, it is implicitly assumed that the taxpayer is fully aware 
of the audit probabilities and the audit productivity when undertaking the 
evasion gamble.  This is not necessarily the case, as the tax authority may 
not be able to announce audit probabilities and the taxpayers may not be 
able to learn the true probabilities either from their own experiences or from 
the experiences of others.  Relatedly, the tax authority may not be willing to 
announce probabilities (or audit procedures), in the hopes that this obfusca-
tion may increase compliance.  Individuals may also have a tendency to 
overweight the probability of an audit, and such behavior could support 
high levels of compliance even with a low objective probability of an audit.  
Further, it is implicitly assumed in the standard approach that the definition 
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of evasion is one-dimensional, or simply unreported income (or the unpaid 
taxes that result directly from unreported income).  In fact, the computa-
tion of an individual’s true tax liability is multidimensional.  There are 
many steps involved in the computation, and, in the presence of a tax code 
that is relentlessly complex, the computation of deductions, credits, taxable 
incomes, and the like is frequently open to interpretation.   Other factors are 
also clearly relevant here.
The effects on tax compliance of at least some of these other factors 
have in fact been examined (Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein, 1998; Slemrod 
and Yitzhaki, 2002; Alm, 2007).  However, to our knowledge, there has been 
little systematic study of the effect on tax compliance of another important 
factor, one that relates directly to the “service” paradigm view of tax ad-
ministration: a more accessible, service-oriented tax administration.  Here, 
we specifically address the question of whether the tax authority can im-
prove compliance behavior by adopting a more helpful interaction with the 
taxpayer.  A related issue is whether this approach is more cost-effective than 
the traditional approach that emphasizes enforcement.
Given the nature of the tax code in many countries, individual tax 
reporting is a complex problem.  Many of the provisions of the tax code are 
subject to interpretation.  The effects of such increased complexity on tax 
compliance are not obvious and can work through several channels.   See, 
among others, Alm (1988), Beck and Jung (1989), Scotchmer and Slemrod 
(1989), Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992), and Krause (2000).
For example, taxpayers may respond to complexity by overpaying 
taxes, especially if they exhibit loss aversion.  Suppose that complexity in 
effect assigns “fuzzy” values to the many elements in an individual’s set of 
reporting decisions (e.g., deductions and tax credits).  In the simplest setting, 
the result of fuzziness is a mean-preserving spread, and the degree of uncer-
tainty is captured by the support of the distribution of the values.  A risk-
averse individual will likely respond to the uncertainty concerning allow-
able deductions and/or credits by erring on the side of caution and claiming 
smaller tax reductions than he or she may take.
Suppose, however, that this same individual is informed each period, 
after filing taxes, of the true tax liability and that this information repeatedly 
informs the individual that he or she overpaid.  Suppose, further, that it is so 
costly to revise past tax returns that he or she does not do so.  This person 
may ultimately feel that the fiscal exchange itself is less beneficial and 
respond by evading more.  This is especially likely to arise if the individual 
feels that others are exploiting the uncertainty to reduce their compliance or 
believes that the penalties are lower when the required level of net income 
reporting is uncertain.  Further, rulings by the tax administration may be seen 
Alm, Jones, and McKee230
by the taxpayer as arbitrary and capricious, and the taxpayer may respond to 
such perceptions by reducing initial levels of compliance and waiting for an 
audit to provide the true interpretation.  The negative effect on compliance 
may be exacerbated if the taxpayer responds to the complexity by intention-
ally evading through frustration, feeling that the tax authority deserves to be 
punished for the complexity through increased evasion.  
In the face of such complex tax regulations, compliance may well be 
enhanced when individuals view their interactions with the tax authority in a 
more positive light.  In particular, if the services provided by the tax author-
ity are viewed as helpful and the responses to questions are provided in a 
timely and accurate fashion, then compliance is likely to be higher than if the 
interaction is viewed as being adversarial.  This latter factor is not captured 
in the conventional economics of crime model of tax compliance.  Again, 
however, it is possible to introduce other scenarios in which greater services 
may have the opposite effect on compliance.  In general, then, an improve-
ment in tax administration services has an ambiguous effect on compliance.  
The next section presents our experimental framework for examining the 
effects on compliance of improved service versus increased enforcement. 
Experimental Design and Pilot Treatments
Our experimental structure replicates the fundamental elements of the 
voluntary reporting system of the U.S. individual income tax.  Subjects earn 
income by performing a simple task, and they self-report this income to a tax 
authority.  Only the individual knows his or her true level of income and can 
choose to report any amount from zero.  An audit then occurs, and there is a 
positive and fixed probability that unreported taxes will be discovered.  If the 
audit detects evasion, both the unpaid taxes and a penalty are collected from 
the individual.
To complicate this basic setting, and thus to introduce the potential 
value of tax service information, we introduce some institutional elements; 
these elements also increase the “parallelism” of our experimental design.  
First, an individual’s earned income is attributed to both “domestic” and 
“foreign” sources.  Since the particular shares from these sources are not 
a matter of interest here, we set the share of foreign income at 40 percent 
of total income for all experiment sessions, a sufficiently high share that 
participants in the experiment will perceive the tax treatment of the foreign 
income as salient.  In filing their tax forms, participants are allowed to claim 
a tax credit for foreign taxes paid (on the foreign income).  Second, partici-
pants are allowed to claim a deduction from total income in determining 
taxable income.  Both the exact level of the credit for foreign taxes paid and 
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the level of the allowed deduction may be uncertain to the taxpayer at the 
time of filing.  This uncertainty is implemented via mean-preserving spreads 
(with a uniform distribution) on the tax credit and on the deduction.  Sub-
jects are always informed of the means of the allowed deduction and credit 
and the ranges for each, but, in some sessions, this uncertainty is resolved, as 
discussed  below.  Subjects are also informed of the tax, audit, and penalty 
rates, and subjects know these values with certainty.  We fix the tax rate at 35 
percent for all sessions.  The audit probability and penalty rates comprise the 
collective enforcement effort.  The audit rate is varied as a treatment; we fix 
the penalty rate at 150 percent for all sessions.   
Since our objective is to compare the compliance effects of increasing 
traditional enforcement efforts versus a more service-oriented tax authority, 
our experimental treatments are changes in the provision by the tax author-
ity of information that reduces the credit and deduction uncertainty versus 
changes in the level of enforcement effort.  We cannot know the value 
individuals attach to the information, and, so, we cannot analytically con-
struct an enforcement effort that would be viewed as equivalent to perfect 
tax ruling information provided by the tax authority.  Accordingly, we adopt 
a strategy adopted by Alm, Cronshaw, and McKee (1993) to compare the 
effects of alternative endogenous enforcement regimes with simple in-
creases in random audit probabilities.  In this study, we compare the effects 
of increasing enforcement against the compliance levels when we provide 
perfect tax information at no cost.  In subsequent work, we intend to broaden 
the information provision regime to allow for information cost and for the 
information to be less than completely accurate.
Our experimental setting is very contextual, and, together with the 
presence of an income earning task, we believe that it provides for the neces-
sary degree of “parallelism” to the naturally occurring world that is crucial 
to the applicability of experimental results (Smith, 1982; Plott, 1987).  The 
experimental setting need not—and should not—attempt to capture all of the 
variation in the naturally occurring environment, but it should sufficiently 
recreate the fundamental elements of the naturally occurring world for the 
results to be relevant in policy debates.  In this regard, our experimental 
design uses tax language, requires that subjects earn income in each period, 
and requires that subjects disclose this income in the same manner as in the 
typical tax form.  As in the naturally occurring setting, there is a time limit 
on the filing of income.  A clock at the bottom of the screen reminds subjects 
of the time remaining, and there is a penalty for failing to file on time set 
equal in all sessions to 10 percent of taxes owed; also, the individual is auto-
matically audited if he or she fails to file on time, so that the subject pays the 
noncompliance fine as well.
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The experimental session proceeds in the following fashion.  Each 
subject sits at a computer located in a cubicle and is not allowed to com-
municate with other subjects.  The instructions are conveyed by a series of 
computer screens that subjects read at their own pace.  Clarification ques-
tions are addressed after subjects have completed the instructions and three 
practice rounds.  Subjects are informed that all decisions will be private; the 
experimenter is unable to observe the decisions, and does not move about 
the room once the session starts to emphasize the fact that the experimenter 
is not observing subjects’ compliance decisions.  These features reduce both 
peer and experimenter effects that could affect the decisions of subjects.  All 
actions that subjects take are made on the computer.
In each round of the experiment, subjects earn income based on per-
formance in a simple computerized task, in which they are required to move 
numbers in the correct order from one location on the computer screen to 
another location.  The subject who finishes the task with the quickest time 
earns the highest income (1000 “lab dollars”); the second and third place fin-
ishers earn 800 lab dollars each, the fourth and fifth place finishers earn 600 
lab dollars each, and so on.  Ties in the earnings task are broken randomly.  
Subjects are informed of their earnings and those of the others in their group 
to ensure that they believe the relative nature of the earnings.  These earn-
ings represent the only information subjects have of other participants.
After earning income, subjects are presented with a computer screen 
that tells them their individual incomes in that round, as well as the tax pol-
icy parameters.  These parameters include the audit, penalty, and tax rates.  
Importantly, subjects are told the amounts of their total incomes that are 
from foreign sources and the corresponding amounts from domestic sources.  
They are also told that they may claim both a deduction and a credit for 
foreign taxes paid.  The deduction reduces the taxes that must be paid on 
reported income; the credit, which is set below the actual foreign taxes paid, 
also reduces the amount of the taxes that they pay.  Subjects are informed 
that they may enter the amounts they choose for their earned incomes, their 
deductions, and their foreign tax credits.  These choices determine the taxes 
that they pay on their reported incomes.  They are also informed that they 
may be audited, in which case all underreported taxes will be discovered and 
a penalty equal to a multiple of unpaid taxes will be imposed.
Subjects choose the amount of money to report to the tax authority for 
each element of the tax form: income, deduction, and foreign tax credit.  For 
each set of entries in the tax form, the computer automatically reports the 
resulting tax liability.  Subjects are able to experiment with different reports 
during the time allowed for filing.  Thus, they can observe the potential 
changes in reported take home income for each potential reporting strategy 
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they investigate.  A timer at the bottom of the tax form counts down the 
remaining time.  Subjects are allowed 100 seconds to file, and the counter 
begins to flash when there are 15 seconds remaining.  Thus, the process in 
the lab mimics that by which a taxpayer may well conduct different calcula-
tions in the time prior to actually filing taxes, whether he or she uses one of 
the available tax software programs or simply does the tax return by hand.
Audits are determined by the use of a “virtual” bingo cage that appears 
on each subject’s computer screen.  An image of a box with 10 balls (blue 
and white) appears on the screen following the tax filing.  The balls begin 
to bounce around in the box, and, after a brief interval, a door opens at the 
top of the box.  If a blue ball exits, then the subject is audited; a white ball 
signifies no audit.  The fraction of blue balls determines the audit probability. 
The audit applies only to the current-period declarations, not to previous (or 
future) periods.  The computer automatically deducts taxes paid and penal-
ties (if any are owed) from subjects’ accounts.  When an audit occurs, the 
true values of the uncertain components (deductions and foreign tax credit) 
are used, and the subject’s declarations are examined.  If the subject has 
underreported tax liability, a fine is imposed.  Tax revenues and any penalties 
are not distributed to subjects.
Subjects are informed that they will keep their aftertax earnings at the 
end of the experiment, converted from lab dollars to U.S. dollars at the rate 
of 800 lab dollars to 1 currency dollar, and paid in cash and in private.  After 
income is reported and an audit (if any) is determined, subjects see one final 
screen that summarizes everything that happened during the round.  This 
process is repeated for a fixed (but unannounced) number of rounds.
Table 1. Experimental Treatments
 Information On? 
Enforcement Effort? No Yes 
Increase (“Base Case” to “High”) T1  
Constant (“Base Case” to “Base Case”)  T2 
Notes:  Enforcement Effort Increase: “Base Case” p=0.2 to “High” p=0.4 
Enforcement Effort Constant: “Base Case” p=0.2 to “Base Case” p=0.2 
In all sessions, the fine rate is fixed at 150%. 
The experimental design is reported in Table 1.  The tax authority has 
two broad policy instruments: the level of enforcement effort and the level 
of service information that is provided to the taxpayer.  As shown in Table 
1, at this point, these instruments have been investigated only in limited and 
basic terms.  Thus, the tax authority can adopt a “Base Case” (or constant) 
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or a “High” (or increased) level of enforcement.  Since enforcement consists 
of both the probability of detection and the level of fines, the high level can 
be implemented as different combinations of higher audit probabilities or 
higher fines, and, at this, time we vary enforcement by varying only the audit 
rate, setting the audit probability at values 0.2 (Base Case) and 0.4 (High).  
Future work will expand the range of audit (and penalty) rates.
As for information, the tax authority can either provide the informa-
tion regarding the interpretation of the rules or not (“Information On?”).  In 
all settings, subjects face (initial) uncertainty regarding the allowed deduc-
tion and the allowed foreign tax credit, and are told at the beginning of each 
round the mean values and the spreads of the deduction and the credit.  We 
hold the level of this uncertainty (via a mean-preserving spread) constant 
throughout all treatments.  When information is made available (“Informa-
tion On? Yes”), subjects are able to click on a button on the screen, and the 
true levels of deduction and foreign tax credit are revealed before they file 
their taxes.  This mimics the ability to call a tax agency information help 
line and obtain accurate information at zero cost.  (In subsequent research, 
we will impose a cost on obtaining this information.)  If no information is 
provided (“Information On? No”), then subjects learn the true values of 
these uncertain variables only after they have filed their taxes.  Overpay-
ments are returned if the taxpayer is audited, as is the practice of the IRS in 
some cases, but not if the taxpayer is not audited.  Thus, there is a cost of 
ignorance to the taxpayer that is greater if not audited, but the audit will also 
uncover over- and undercompliance.
The fixed parameters used for all sessions are reported in Table 2.
Table 2. Experimental Parameters
Parameter Mean High Low Increment/Deviation
Income 800 1000 600 100 
Percent Foreign 40% N/A N/A N/A 
Tax Rate—Domestic 35% N/A N/A N/A 
Tax Rate—Foreign 35% N/A N/A N/A 
Deduction 20%   +/- 50 Lab$ 
Foreign Tax Credit 50%   +/- 25 Lab$ 
Fine Rate 150% N/A N/A N/A 
For our pilot study, we have employed a within-subjects design.  The 
treatments are implemented as changes in the tax filing setting.  Thus, 
subjects are in a Base Case setting for the first 10 rounds, and, in round 11, 
a treatment condition is turned on that is in place for the next 10 rounds, at 
which point the session ends.  In future work, we will vary the order of the 
treatments.
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The experimental laboratory consists of multiple networked comput-
ers, a server, and software designed for this series of experiments.  Pilot 
sessions were conducted on the University of Calgary campus using student 
subjects recruited via announcements on campus.  Potential subjects sign up 
for the sessions using a Web page and are invited to participate in a specific 
session by e-mail.  Subjects are not permitted to participate in more than one 
of the sessions used for this paper, only subjects recruited specifically for a 
session are allowed to participate, and no subject has prior experience in this 
experimental setting.  Methods adhere to all guidelines concerning the ethi-
cal treatment of human subjects.  Sessions lasted just over 90 minutes, and 
earnings were in the range of $19.25 to $26.75.
Preliminary Results
We have conducted one pilot session for each of the treatments listed in 
Table 1.  The overall compliance effects are reported in Table 3.  We report 
all results as changes in the average level of compliance, calculated as an 
individual subject’s reported income over his or her true income, averaged 
over all subjects.  Also, since we utilize a within-subjects design and im-
pose the policy change in round 11 of each session, it is useful to examine 
different behavioral responses using some simple graphs.  There are several 
compliance measures that we can evaluate given the choices of reporting 
strategies that individuals can adopt in this setting.  Individuals can evade 
(and increase take home income) in a variety of ways.  They may simply 
underreport income; they may also cheat by failing to report the true amount 
of the tax deduction or of the tax credit.  Accordingly, in Table 3, we report 
three measures of evasion: income underreporting, deduction overreporting, 
and tax liability underreporting.
Table 3. Aggregate Results by Experimental Treatment
 Information On? 
Enforcement Effort? No Yes 
Increase T1
? Deduction Compliance: 0.360 
? Income Reporting: 0.083 
? Tax Liability Reporting: 0.190 
Number Increasing Tax Liability 
Reporting: 9 of 14 (64%) 
Constant  T2 
? Deduction Compliance: -0.07 
? Income Reporting: -0.027 
? Tax Liability Reporting: -0.063 
Number Increasing Tax Liability 
Reporting: 8 of 16 (50%) 
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These preliminary results indicate that increasing enforcement effort 
increases all three types of compliance.  Perhaps surprisingly, providing 
uncertainty-reducing information has no significant impact on compliance.
These results are rather aggregate, and, in Figures 1 to 3, we report 
the round-by-round averages for the various compliance measures; for each 
case, the results are denoted by the name of the metric and the treatment.  
We see that for T2, there is little change in the aggregate behavior when 
the information is provided beginning in round 11.  This is consistent with 
the result in Table 3 that half of the subjects in T2 increased compliance 
when the information was provided and half lowered or did not change their 
compliance.  The most compelling result is shown in Figure 3 where the 
overall level of tax liability reporting is plotted for the 20 decision rounds.  
The increase in compliance in treatment T1 is most striking here, so that it 
is clear that the subjects respond to the higher level of enforcement effort.  
However, at this point, our results must be considered very preliminary.  
We have a very small sample, we have conducted only a single session in 
each treatment, and we have investigated a very limited set of experimental 
parameters.
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Figure 2. Deduction Compliance
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Discussion and Conclusions
The deterrent effects of increased enforcement have been well documented.  
In contrast, the compliance effects of improved tax administrative services 
are largely unknown.  It seems plausible that the tax agency can improve its 
public perception by providing taxpayer services such as prefiling informa-
tion, and that the increased service level would translate into higher compli-
ance.  However, the actual effects on compliance of such improved service 
have not been investigated.
The service dimension that we examine here is the provision of uncer-
tainty-reducing information prior to the taxpayer’s filing decision.  We find 
that this information provision has a negligible effect on reporting, and as 
many subjects increased compliance as did not after this information was 
provided.  In contrast, a significant majority of subjects increased compli-
ance when the audit rate was increased.
Information is an interesting item in the context of the effect of uncer-
tain rules in tax-filing behavior.  As Krause (2000) emphasizes, ambiguity 
in the tax code can be seen as an opportunity to evade or as a risk that can 
be reduced by overstating one’s tax liability.  Thus, information provided by 
the tax authority can have potentially offsetting effects.  For those subjects 
in our experiment who were claiming the maximum deduction (the top end 
of the range), the new information may lead them to reduce this claim and 
to report their true allowed deductions.  For those subjects who were hedg-
ing by reporting lower levels of deductions, the information will be used to 
increase their claimed deductions.  Thus, the aggregate effect will depend on 
the number of taxpayers of each type.  Investigation of this effect will have 
to wait until our sample sizes are larger.
Of course, information is only one mechanism by which the tax agency 
can increase its service provided to taxpayers.  We are currently design-
ing treatments to investigate the effects of these other mechanisms as well.  
Thus, even if the aggregate effect of information provision is found to be 
zero with larger sample sizes and broader parameter spaces, there are many 
other avenues by which the tax agency may be able to enhance compliance 
through the adoption of a service paradigm. For example, in the face of un-
certainty regarding allowed deductions and credits, the tax agency may wish 
to apply differential penalties.  Thus, underreported income may be punished 
more harshly than a claimed deduction that the individual is not permitted to 
claim.  In this way, the tax agency may be seen as accommodating “honest 
mistakes” while punishing deliberate evasion.
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